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Abstract—With rise in security breaches over the past few
years, there has been an increasing need to mine insights
from social media platforms to raise alerts of possible attacks
in an attempt to defend conflict during competition. We use
information from the darkweb forums by leveraging the reply
network structure of user interactions with the goal of predicting
enterprise cyber attacks. We use a suite of social network features
on top of supervised learning models and validate them on a
binary classification problem that attempts to predict whether
there would be an attack on any given day for an organization.
We conclude from our experiments using information from 53
forums in the darkweb over a span of 12 months to predict real
world organization cyber attacks of 2 different security events
that analyzing the path structure between groups of users is
better than just studying network centralities like Pagerank or
relying on the user posting statistics in the forums.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the recent data breaches such as those of Yahoo, Uber,
Equifax1 among several others that emphasize the increasing
financial and social impact of cyber attacks, there has been
an enormous requirement for technologies that could provide
such organizations with prior alerts on such data breach possi-
bilities. These breaches are a direct or indirect result of cyber,
electronic, and information operations to infiltrate systems and
infrastructure as well as gain unauthorized access to informa-
tion, thus setting an example of conflict during competition.
On the vulnerability front, the Risk Based Security’s VulnDB
database2 published a total of 4,837 vulnerabilities in a quarter
of 2017, which was around 30% higher than previous year.
This motivates the need for extensive systems that can utilize
vulnerability associated information from external sources to
raise alerts on such cyber attacks. The darkweb is one such
place on the internet where users can share information on
software vulnerabilities and ways to exploit them [1], [15].
Surprisingly, it might be difficult to track the actual intention
of those users, thus making it necessary to use data mining
and learning to identify the discussions among the noise that
could potentially raise alerts on attacks on external enterprises.
Some of the authors are supported through the AFOSR Young Investigator
Program (YIP) grant FA9550-15-1-0159, ARO grant W911NF-15-1-0282, and
the DoD Minerva program grant N00014-16-1-2015.
1https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2017/09/equifax-data-breach-what-do,
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2016/09/yahoo-breach-watch
2https://www.riskbasedsecurity.com/2017/05/29-increase-in-vulnerabilities-
already-disclosed-in-2017/
In this paper, we leverage the information obtained from
analyzing the reply network structure of discussions in the
darkweb forums to understand the extent to which the darkweb
information can be useful for predicting real world cyber
attacks.
Most of the work on vulnerability discussions on trading
exploits in the underground forums [9], [13], [14] and related
social media platforms like Twitter [2], [8], [15] have focused
on two aspects: (1) analyzing vulnerabilities discussed or
traded in the forums and the markets, thereby giving rise to the
belief that the “lifecycle of vulnerabilities" in these forums and
marketplaces and their exploitation have significant impact on
real world cyber attacks [13], [14] (2) prioritizing or scoring
vulnerabilities using these social media platforms or binary
file appearance logs of machines to predict the risk state of
machines or systems [7], [11]. These two components have
been used in silos and in this paper, we ignore the steps
between vulnerability exploit analysis and the final task of real
world cyber attack prediction by removing the preconceived
notions used in earlier studies where vulnerability exploitation
is considered a precursor towards attack prediction. We instead
hypothesize on user interaction dynamics conceived through
posts surrounding these vulnerabilities in these underground
platforms to generate warnings for future attacks. We note that
we do not consider whether vulnerabilities have been exploited
or not in these discussions since a lot of zero-day attacks
[11] might occur before such vulnerabilities are even indexed
and their gravity might lie hidden in discussions related to
other associated vulnerabilities or some discussion on exploits.
The premise on which this research is set up is based on the
dynamics of all kinds of discussions in the darkweb forums,
but we attempt to filter out the noise to mine important patterns
by studying whether a piece of information gains traction
within important communities.
To this end, the major contributions of this research inves-
tigation are as follows:
• We create a network mining technique using the directed
reply network of users who participate in the darkweb
forums, to extract a set of specialized users we term
experts whose posts with popular vulnerability mentions
gain attention from other users in a specific time frame.
• Following this, we generate several time series of features
that capture the dynamics of interactions centered around
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these experts across individual forums as well as general
social network and forum posting statistics based feature
time series.
• We use these time series features and train a supervised
learning model based on logistic regression with attack
labels for 2 different events from an organization to
predict daily attacks. We obtain the best results with
an F1 score of 0.53 on a feature that explores the path
structure between experts and other users compared to
the random (without prior probabilities) F1 score of 0.37.
Additionally, we find superior performance of features
from discussions that involve vulnerability information
over network centralities and forum posting statistics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we introduce
several terms and the dataset related to the vulnerabilities and
the darkweb in Section II, the general framework for attack
prediction including feature curation and learning models
in Section III, and finally the experimental evaluations in
Section IV.
II. BACKGROUND AND DATASET
In this section, we describe the dataset used in our research
to analyze the interaction patterns of the users in the Darkweb
and the real world security incidents3 data that we use as
ground truth for the evaluation of our prediction models.
A. Enterprise-Relevant External Threats (GT)
We use the Ground Truth (GT) available from the
CAUSE program 4 that provided us with data from
Armstrong Corporation which contains information on
cyber attacks on their systems in the period of April 2016
to September 2017. The data contains the following relevant
attributes: { event-type: The type of attack called event−type
and event occurred date: Date on which there was an attack
of particular event-type. The event-types that are used in this
study are: Malicious email refers to an event associated with an
individual in the organization receiving an email that contains
either a malicious attachment of link, and Endpoint Malware
refers to a malware on endpoint that is discovered on an
endpoint device. This includes, but not limited to, ransomware,
spyware, and adware. As shown in Figure 1, the distribution
of attacks over time is different for the events. The total
number of incidents reported for the events are as follows:
119 tagged as endpoint-malware and 135 for malicious-email
events resulting in a total of 280 incidents over a span of 17
months that were considered in our study.
B. Darkweb data
The dark web forms a small part of the deep web, the
part of the Web not indexed by web search engines, although
sometimes the term deep web is mistakenly used to refer
specifically to the dark web. We obtain all darkweb data
used in this study through an API provided by a commercial
platform5.
3We would often use the terms attacks/incidents/events interchangeably
4https://www.iarpa.gov/index.php/research-programs/cause
5Data is provided by Cyber Reconaissance, Inc., www.cyr3con.ai
(a) (b)
Fig. 1: Weekly occurrence of security breach incidents of
different types (a) Malicious email (b) Endpoint Malware
A darkweb forum structure exhibits a hierarchical structure:
each forum consists of several independent threads, a thread
caters to a particular discussion on a topic, each thread spans
several posts initiated by multiple users over time. We note
that one user can appear multiple times in the sequence
of posts depending on when and how many times the user
posted in that thread. However the dataset we obtained does
not contain the hierarchical information of reposting - it does
not provide us with which user did a particular user, reply to,
while posting or replying in a thread. We filter out forums
based on a threshold number of posts that were created in the
timeframe of January 2016 to September 2017. We gathered
data from 179 forums in that time period where the total
number of unique posts were 557,689 irrespective of the
thread that they belonged to. The number of forums with less
than 100 posts is large and therefore we only consider forums
which have greater than 5,000 posts in that time period which
gave us a total of 53 forums. We denote the set of these 53
forums used in this dataset using the symbol F .
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE): The
database of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
maintained on a platform operated by the MITRE corporation 6
provides an identity mapping for publicly known information-
security vulnerabilities and exposures. We collect all the
information regarding the vulnerability mentions in the
darkweb forums in the period from January 2016 to October
2017. The total number of CVEs mentioned in the posts
across all forums in this period are 3553.
CVE - CPE mapping: A CPE (Common Platform
Enumeration) is a structured naming scheme for identifying
and grouping clusters of information technology systems,
software and packages maintained in a platform NVD
(National Vulnerability Database) operated by NIST 7. Each
CVE can be assigned to different CPE groups based on the
naming system of CPE families as described in [9]. Similarly,
each CPE family can have several CVEs that conform to
its vendors and products that the specific CPE caters to.
In order to cluster the set of CVEs in our study into a set
of CPE groups, we use the set of CPE tags for each CVE
from the NVD database maintained by NIST. For the CPE
6http://cve.mitre.org
7https://nvd.nist.gov/cpe.cfm
tags, we only consider the operating system platform and the
application environment tags for each unique CPE. Examples
of CPE would include: Microsoft Windows_95, Canonical
ubuntu_linux, Hp elitebook_725_g3. The first component in
each of these CPEs denote the operating system platform and
the second component denotes the application environment
and their versions.
III. FRAMEWORK FOR ATTACK PREDICTION
The mechanism for attack predictions can be described in 3
steps : (1) given a time point t on which we need to predict an
enetrprise attack of a particular event type (2) we use features
from the darkweb forums prior to t and, (3) we use these
features as input to a learned model to predict attack on t. So
one of the main tasks involves learning the attack prediction
model, one for each event type. Below we describe steps (2)
and (3) - feature curation and building supervised learning
models.
A. Feature curation
We first describe the mechanism in which we build temporal
networks following which we describe the features used for
the prediction problem. We build 3 groups of features across
forums: (1) Expert centric (2) User/Forum statistics (3) Net-
work centralities.
Darkweb Reply Network: We assume the absence of global
user IDs across forums8 and therefore analyze the social
interactions using networks induced on specific forums instead
of considering the global network across all forums. We denote
the directed reply graph of a forum f ∈ F by Gf = (V f , Ef )
where V f denotes the set of users who posted or replied in
some thread in forum f at some time in our considered time
frame of data and Ef denotes the set of 3-tuple (u1, u2, rt)
directed edges where u1, u2 ∈ V f and rt denotes the time
at which u1 replied to a post of u2 in some thread in f ,
u1 → u2 denoting the edge direction. We denote by Gfτ =
(V fτ , E
f
τ ), a temporal subgraph of G
f , τ being a time window
such that V fτ denotes the set of individuals who posted in f
in that window and Efτ denotes the set of tuples (v1, v2, rt)
such that rt ∈ τ , v1, v2 ∈ V fτ . We use 2 operations to create
temporal networks: Create - that takes a set of forum posts
in f within a time window τ as input and creates a temporal
subgraph Gfτ and Merge - that takes two temporal graphs as
input and merges them to form an auxiliary graph. To keep
the notations simple, we would drop the symbol f when we
describe the operations for a specific forum in F as context
but which would apply for any forum f ∈ F . We describe
these two operations in brief, however a detailed algorithm
relating the network construction is given in Algorithm 1 of
Appendix A19. We adopt an incremental analysis approach
8Note that even in the presence of global user IDs across forums, a lot of
anonymous or malicious users would create multiple profiles across forums
and create multiple posts with different profiles, identifying and merging
which is an active area of research.
9Online Appendix: http://www.public.asu.edu/~ssarka18/appendix.pdf
Fig. 2: An illustration to show the Merge operation: GHτ
denotes the historical network using which the experts shown
in gray are computed. {Gt1 , Gt2 , . . .} denote the networks at
time t1, t2, . . . ∈ τ , τ ∈ Γ.
by splitting the entire set of time points in our frame of study
into a sequence of time windows Γ = {τ1, τ2, . . . , τQ}, where
each subsequence τi, i ∈ [1,Q] is equal in time span and non-
overlapping and the subsequences are ordered by their starting
time points for their respective span.
CREATE: Creating the reply graph - Let h be a particular
thread or topic within a forum f containing posts by users
V fh = {u1, . . . , uk} posted at corresponding times T fh =
{t1, . . . , tk}, where k denotes the number of posts in that
thread and ti ≥ tj for any i > j, that is the posts are
chronologically ordered. To create the set of edges Efh , we
connect 2 users (ui, uj) ∈ V fh such that i > j, that is user ui
has potentially replied to uj , and subject to a set of spatial
and temporal constraints (Appendix A1). These constraints
make up for the absence of exact information about the reply
hierarchies as to whom u replied to in a particular post in h.
MERGE: Merging network - In order to create a time series
feature Tx,f for feature x from threads in forum f that maps
each time point t ∈ τ , τ ∈ Γ to a real number, we use 2
networks: (1) the historical network GHτ which spans over
time Hτ such that ∀t′ ∈ Hτ , and t ∈ τ , we have t′ < t,
and (2) the network Gft induced by user interactions between
users in Et, which varies temporally for each t ∈ τ . We note
that the historical network GHτ would be different for each
subsequence τ and same for all t ∈ τ , so as the subsequences
τ ∈ Γ progress with time, the historical network GHτ also
changes, and we discuss the choice of spans τ ∈ Γ and
Hτ in Section IV. Finally, for computing feature values for
each time point t ∈ τ , we merge the 2 networks GHτ and
Gt to form the auxiliary network GHτ ,t = (VHτ ,t, EHτ ,t),
where VHτ ,t = VHτ ∪ Vt and EHτ ,t = EHτ ∪ Et. A visual
illustration of this method is shown in Figure 2. Now we
describe the several features we used that would be fed to a
learning model for attack prediction. We compute time series
of several features x, Tx,f [t] for every time point t in our
frame of study and for every forum f separately.
1. Expert centric features
We extract a set of users we term experts who have a
history of CVE mentions in their posts and whose posts have
Group Features Description
Expert centric
Graph Conductance
τx[t] =
∑
x∈expτ
∑
y∈Vt\expτ pi(expτ )Pxy
pi(expτ )
where pi(.) is the stationary distribution of the network GHτ ,t, Pxy denotes the probability of
random walk from vertices x to y. The conductance represents the probability of taking a random walk
from any of the experts to one of the users in Vt \ expτ , normalized by the probability weight of
being on an expert.
Shortest Path
τx[t] = 1|expτ |
∑
e∈expτ minu∈Vt\expτ
se,u
where se,u denotes the shortest path from an expert e to user u following the direction of edges.
Expert replies
τx[t] = 1|expτ |
∑
e∈expτ |OutNeighbors(e)|
where OutNeighbors(.) denotes the out neighbors of user in the network GHτ ,t.
Common Communities
τx[t] = {N (c(u) | c(u) ∈ cexperts ∧ u ∈ Vt \ expτ}
wher c(u) denotes the community index of user u, cexperts that of the experts and N (.)
denotes a counting function. It counts the number of users who share communities with experts.
Forum/User Statistcs
Number of threads τx[t] = |{h | thread h was posted on t}|
Number of users τx[t] = |{u | user u posted on t}|
Number of expert
threads
τx[t] = |{h | thread h was posted on t by users u ∈ experts}|
Number of CVE men-
tions
τx[t] = |{CV E | CVE was mentioned in some post on t}|
Network Centralities
Outdegreek τx[t] = Average value of top k users, by outdegree on t
Outdegreek CVE τx[t] = Average value of top k users with more than 1 CVE mention in their posts, by outdegree on t
Pagerankk τx[t] = Average value of top k users, by Pagerank on t
Pagerankk CVE τx[t] = Average value of top k users with more than 1 CVE mention in their posts, by pagerank on t
Betweennessk τx[t] = Average value of top k users, by Betweenness on t
Betweennessk CVE τx[t] = Average value of top k users with more than 1 CVE mention in their posts, by betweenness on t
TABLE I: List of features used for learning. Each feature τx is computed separately across forums.
gained attention in terms of replies. Following that, we mine
several features that explain how attention is broadcast by
these experts to other posts. All these features are computed
using the auxiliary networks GHτ ,t for each time t. Our
hypothesis is based on the premise that any unusual activity
must spur attention from users who have knowledge about
vulnerabilities.
We focus on users whose posts in a forum contain most dis-
cussed CVEs belonging to important CPEs over the timeframe
of analysis, where the importance will shortly be formalized.
For each forum f , we use the historical network GfHτ to extract
the set of experts relevant to timeframe τ , that is expfτ ∈ V fHτ .
First, we extract the top CPE groups CP topτ in the time frame
Hτ based on the number of historical mentions of CVEs. We
sort the CPE groups based on the sum of the CVE mentions
in τ that belong to the respective CPE groups and take the top
5 CPE groups by sum in each Hτ . Using these notations, the
experts expfτ from history Hτ considered for time span τ are
defined as users in f with the following three constraints: (1)
Users who have mentioned a CVE in their post in Hτ . This
ensures that the user engages in the forums with content that
is relevant to vulnerabilities. (2) let θ(u) denote the set of CPE
tags of the CVEs mentioned by user u in his/her posts in Hτ
and such that it follows the constraint: either θ(u) ∈ CP topτ
where the user’s CVEs are grouped in less than 5 CPEs or,
CP topτ ∈ θ(u) in cases where a user has posts with CVEs in
the span Hτ , grouped in more than 5 CPEs. This constraint
filters out users who discuss vulnerabilities which are not
among the top CPE groups in Hτ and (3) the in-degree of the
user u in GHτ should cross a threshold. This constraint ensures
that there are a significant number of users who potentially
responded to this user thus establishing u’s central position in
the reply network. Essentially, these set of experts expτ from
Hτ would be used for all the time points in τ . We curate
path and community based features based on these experts
listed in Table I. These expert-centric features try to quantify
the distance between an expert and a daily user(non-expert) in
terms of how fast a post from that user receives attention from
the expert. In that sense, the community features also measure
the like-mindedness of non-experts and experts.
Why focus on experts? To show the significance of these
properties in comparison to other users, we perform the
following hypothesis test: we collect the time periods of
3 widely known security events: the Wannacry ransomware
attack that happened on May 12, 2017 and the vulnerability
MS-17-010, the Petya cyber attack on 27 June, 2017 with the
associated vulnerabilities CVE-2017-0144, CVE-2017-0145
and MS-17-010, the Equifax breach attack primarily on March
9, 2017 with vulnerability CVE-2017-5638. We consider two
sets of users across all forums - expτ , where GHτ denotes the
corresponding historical network prior to τ in which these 3
events occurred and the second set of users being all Ualt who
are not experts and who fail either one of the two constraints:
they have mentioned CVEs in their posts which do not belong
to CP top or their in-degree in GHτ lies below the threshold.
We consider GHτ being induced by users in the last 3 weeks
prior to the occurrence week of each event for both the cases,
and we consider the total number of interactions ignoring
the direction of reply of these users with other users. Let
degexp denote the vector of count of interactions in which
the experts were involved and degalt denote the vector of
counts of interactions in which the users in Ualt were involved.
We randomly pick number of users from Ualt equal to the
number of experts and sort the vectors by count. We conduct
a 2 sample t-test on he vectors degexp and degalt. The null
hypothesis H0 and the alternate hypothesis H1 are defined as
follows; H0 : degexp ≤ degalt, H1 : degexp > degalt.
The null hypothesis is rejected at significance level α =
0.01 with p-value of 0.0007. This suggests that with high
probability, experts tend to interact more prior to important real
world cybersecurity breaches than other users who randomly
post CVEs.
Now, we conduct a second t-test where we randomly pick
4 weeks not in the weeks considered for the data breaches, to
pick users Ualt with the same constraints. We use the same
hypotheses as above and when we perform statistical tests for
significance, we find that the null hypothesis is not rejected at
α=0.01 with a p-value close to 0.05. This empirical evidence
from the t-test also suggests that the interactions with expτ
are more correlated with an important cybersecurity incident
than the other users who post CVEs not in top CPE groups and
therefore it is better to focus on users exhibiting our desired
properties as experts for cyber attack prediction. Note that
the t − test evidence also incorporates a special temporal
association since we collected events from three interleaved
timeframes corresponding to the event dates.
2. User/Forum Statistics Features
We try to see whether the fourm or user posting statistics are
themselves any indicators of future cyber attacks - for this we
compute Forum/User Statistics as described in Table I.
3. Network centralities Features
In addition, we also tested several network Centrality features
mentioned in Table I. The purpose is to check whether
emergence of central users in the reply network Gt, t ∈ τ ,
are good predictors of cyber attacks. We note that in this case,
we only use the daily reply networks to compute the features
unlike the expert centric network features where we use GHτ ,t
.
B. Learning Models for Prediction
In this section we explain how we use the time series data
Tx,f to predict an attack at any given time point t. We consider
a supervised learning model in which the time series Tx is
formed by averaging Tx,f across all forums in f ∈ F at each
time point t and then using them for the prediction task. We
treat the attack prediction problem in this paper as a binary
classification problem in which the objective is to predict
whether there would be an attack at a given time point t.
Since the incident data in this paper contains the number of
incidents that occurred at time point t, we assign a label of 1
for t if there was at least one attack at t and 0 otherwise.
In [4], the authors studied the effect of longitudinal sparsity
in high dimensional time series data, where they propose an
approach to assign weights to the same features at different
time spans to capture the temporal redundancy. We use 2
parameters: δ that denotes the start time prior to t from where
we consider the features for prediction and η, the time span
for the features to be considered. An illustration is shown in
Figure 3 where to predict an attack occurrence at time t, we
use the features for each time th ∈ [t−η−δ, t−δ]. Here we use
Fig. 3: Temporal feature selection window for predicting an
attack at time t
logistic regression with longitudinal ridge sparsity that models
the probability of an attack as follows with X being the set of
features and β being the vector of coefficients:
P (attack(t) = 1| X) = 1
1 + e−(β0+
∑δ
k=η+δ βk xt−k)
(1)
The final objective function to minimize over N instances
where N here is the number of time points spanning the attack
time frame is : l(β) = −∑Ni=1(yi(β0 + xiTβ) − log(1 +
expβ0+xi
T β) + λβTβ, y being the instance label.
One of the major problems of the dataset is the imbalance in
the training and test dataset as will be described in Section IV,
so in order to use all features in each group together for
prediction, we use 3 additional regularization terms: the L1
penalty, the L2 penalty and the Group Lasso regularization
[5]. The final objective function can be written as:
l(β) = −
N∑
i=1
log(1+e−yi(β
Txi))+
m
2
‖β‖22+l‖β‖1+g.GL(β)
(2)
where m, l and g are the hyper-parameters for the regular-
ization terms and the GL(β) term is
∑G
g=1‖βIg‖2, where
Ig is the index set belonging to the gth group of variables,
g = 1 . . . G. Here each g is the time index th ∈ [t−η−δ, t−δ],
so this group variable selection selects all features of one
time in history while reducing some other time points to 0.
It has the attractive property that it does variable selection at
the temporal group level and is invariant under (group-wise)
orthogonal transformations like ridge regression. We note
that while there are several other models that could be used
for prediction that incorporates the temporal and sequential
nature of the data like hidden markov models (HMM) and
recurrent neural networks (RNN), the logit model allows us
to transparently adjust to the sparsity of data, specially in he
absence of a large dataset.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATIONS
In our work, the granularity for each time index in the T
function is 1 day, that is we compute feature values over
all days in the time frame of our study. For incrementally
computing the values of the time series, we consider the time
span of each subsequence τ ∈ Γ as 1 month, and for each τ ,
we consider Hτ = 3 months immediately preceding τ . That
is, for every additional month of training or test data that is
provided to the model, we use the preceding 3 months to create
the historical network and compute the corresponding features
on all days in τ . For choosing the experts with an in-degree
threshold, we select a threshold of 10 to filter out users having
in-degree less than 10 in GHτ from expτ . For the centralities
features, we set k to be 50, that is we choose the top 50
users sorted by that corresponding metric in Table I. We build
different learning models using the ground truth available from
separate event− types.
As mentioned in Section III-B, we consider a binary predic-
tion problem in this paper - we assign an attack flag of 1 for at
least 1 attack on each day and 0 otherwise have the following
statistics: for malicious-email, out of 335 days considered
in the dataset, there have been reported attacks on 97 days
which constitutes a positive class ratio of around 29%, for
endpoint-malware the total number of attack days are 31 out
of 306 days of considered span in the training dataset which
constitutes a positive class ratio of around 26%. For evaluating
the performance of the models on the dataset, we split the time
frame of each event into 70%-30% averaged to the nearest
month separately for each event− type. That is we take the
first 80% of time in months as the training dataset and the rest
20% in sequence for the test dataset. We avoid shuffle split as
generally being done in cross-validation techniques in order
to consider the consistency in using sequential information
when computing the features. As shown in Figures 1, since the
period of attack information provided varies in time for each
of the events, we use different time frames for the training
model and the test sets. For the event malicious email which
remains our primary testbed evaluation event, we consider the
time period from October 2016 to June 2017 (9 months) in
the Darkweb forums for our training data and the period from
July 2017 to August 2017 (3 months) as out test dataset, for
the endpoint−malware, we use the time period from April
2016 to September 2016 (6 months) as our training time period
and June 2017 to August 2017 (3 months) as our test data for
evaluation.
We consider a span of 1 week time window η while keeping
δ = 8 days. From among the set of statistics features that
were used for predicting malicious−email attacks shown in
Figure 4(e), we observe the best results using the number of
threads as the signal for which we observe a precision of 0.43,
recall of 0.59 and an F1 score of 0.5 against the random F1
of 0.34 for this type of attacks. From among the set of expert-
centric features in Figure 4(a), we obtain the best results from
graph conductance with a precision of 0.44, recall of 0.65 and
an F1 score of 0.53 which shows an increase in recall over the
number of threads measure. Additionally, we observe that the
best features in terms of F1 score are graph conductance and
shortest paths whereas number of threads and vulnerability
mentions turn out to be the best among the statistics. For
the attacks belonging to the type endpoint − malware, we
observe similar characteristics for the expert-centric features
in Figure 4(b) where we obtain a best precision of 0.34, recall
of 0.74 and an F1 score of 0.47 against a random F1 of
0.35, followed by the shortest paths measure. However for
the statistics measures we obtain a precision of 0.35, recall
0.61 and an F1 score of 0.45 for the vulnerability mentions
followed by the number of threads which gives us an F1
score of 0.43. Although the common communities features
doesn’t help much in the overall prediction results, in the
(a) malicious-email (b) endpoint-malware
(c) malicious-email (d) endpoint-malware
(e) malicious-email (f) endpoint-malware
Fig. 4: Classification results for the features considering the
logistic regression model: δ = 7 days, η = 8 days.
following section we describe a special case that demonstrates
the predictive power of the community structure in networks.
On the other hand, when we investigate the centralities features
with respect to the prediction performance in Figure 4(c),
we find that just looking at network centralities does not
help. The best values we obtain for malicious-email event
predictions are from the outdegree and betweenness metrics
both of which gives us an F1 score of 0.41. Surprisingly, we
find that when the metrics are used for only the users with
CVE mentions, the results are worse with the best F1 score
for outdegree CVE having an F1 score of 0.38. This calls for
more complex understanding of path structures between users
than just focusing on user significance solely. The challenging
nature of the supervised prediction problem is not just due to
the issue of class imbalance, but also the lack of large samples
in the dataset which if present, could have been used for
sampling purposes. As an experiment, we also used Random
Forests as the classification model, but we did not observe any
significant improvements in the results over the random case.
For the model with the Group lasso regularization in Equa-
tion 2, we set the parameters m, l, g and 0.3, 0.3 and 0.1
respectively. We obtain better results for each group of features
together on the malicious-email events with an F1 score of
0.55 for Expert centric, 0.51 with Forum/user statistics and
0.49 with network centrality based features.
Prediction in High Activity Weeks
One of the main challenges in predicting external threats
without any method to correlate them with external data
sources like darkweb or any other database is that it is difficult
to validate which kinds of attacks are most correlated with
these data sources. To this end, we examine a controlled
experiment setup for the malicious− email attacks in which
we only consider the weeks which exhibited high frequency
of attacks compared to the overall timeframe: in our case we
consider weeks having more than 5 attacks in test time frame.
These high numbers may be due to multiple attacks in one or
few specific days or few attacks on all days. We run the same
supervised prediction method but evaluate them only on these
specific weeks.
(a) Expert centric (b) User/Forum Statistics
(c) Centralities
Fig. 5: Classification results for malicious−email attacks in
high frequency weeks, δ = 7 days and η = 8 days.
From the results shown in Figure 5, we find that the
best results were shown by the common communities feature
having a precision of 0.7 and a recall of 0.63 and an F1
score of 0.67 compared to the random (no priors) F1 score
of 0.48 and a random (with priors) F1 score of 0.34 for
the same time parameters. Among the statistics measures,
we obtained a highest F1 score of 0.63 for the vulnerability
mentions feature. From among the set of centralities features,
we find that betweenness measure has the best F1 score of
0.58 with a precision of 0.5 and a recall of 0.78. This also
suggests the fact that analyzing the path structure between
nodes is useful since betweenness relies on the paths passing
through a node. Additionally, we find unlike the results over
all the days, for these specific weeks, the model achieves high
precision while maintaining comparable recall emphasizing
the fact that the number of false positives are also reduced
during these periods. This correlation between the weeks that
exhibit huge attacks and the prediction results imply that the
network structure analytics can definitely help generate alerts
for cyber attacks.
V. RELATED WORK AND CONCLUSION
Using network analysis to understand the topology of Dark-
web forums has been studied at breadth in [6] where the
authors use social network analysis techniques on the reply
networks of forums. There have been several attempts to use
external social media data sources to predict real world cyber
attacks [2], [7], [8]. Using machine learning models to predict
security threats [2] has many open research fields including
predicting whether a vulnerability would be exploited based
on Darkweb sources [3], [9]. The availability of large external
data sources makes the case for using machine learning
methods for cyber attack prediction more promising. Previous
studies also include using time series models for forecasting
the number of cyber incidents [16] which motivates the need
of such models for cyber attack prediction. The authors in
[17] look at text mining techniques to understand the content
of the posts in various social media platforms that provide
threat intelligence. In this study, we argue that the darkweb
can be a reliable source of information for predicting external
enterprise threats. We leverage the network and interaction
patterns in the forums to understand the extent to which they
can be used as useful indicators. Our study also opens further
research possibilities surrounding sentiment analysis on these
discussions that could help track the malicious discussions and
hence defend against cyber conflict during competition.
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